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INTRODUCTION
Vanuatu has two different systems of land 
tenure: a formal system inherited from the 
colonial period and an uncodified customary 
system. The customary system is character-
ised by its elaborate nature, opacity to out-
siders, and variety with notable differences 
over how land is exchanged, inherited or 
otherwise accessed both within and between 
islands.
Social organisation is closely bound to 
land rights and management, to the extent 
that place of origin and personal identity 
have been described as synonymous. In 
apparent contradiction to this immutable 
sense of place and identity is a society 
based on different layers of land rights which 
are widely divested, creating bonds within 
and between groups. This system permits 
access to different resources, allows for 
migration and accommodates shifts in power 
between groups and individuals. Surplus 
land can be divested to build power bases. 
Under custom, the flexible transfer of land-
use rights generally allows for and helps 
maintain the fabric of social relations. Land 
is seen as communally owned, to varying 
degrees, but is uniformly administered by 
patriarchs.
The formal system of land tenure was 
introduced under the colonial period and 
largely continued following Independence in 
1980. Although French law has equal status 
to ‘British’ law, the formal tenure system is 
based on the English system of ‘Torrens title’ 
in which land is owned by one or more indi-
viduals or bodies corporate, and ownership 
is verifiable through a legally guaranteed 
entry on a register. 
Both tourism and construction, the most 
important drivers of economic growth in 
Vanuatu, are land-hungry industries that 
demand clear and verifiable land titles as 
assets on which to build and sell. Banks will 
not lend on customary-owned land as they 
perceive too many risks in the undocument-
ed network of rights-holders who could later 
make claims to the land. The Government 
of Vanuatu also demands sole possession 
of the state infrastructure; the schools, hos-
pitals and administrative centres that were 
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nominally returned to customary ownership 
on Independence. In this context ‘develop-
ment’ is equated with a shift to the formal 
system.
As the fruits of economic development 
seem to be accessible only through the for-
mal system, both ni-Vanuatu and (largely 
foreign) investors have incentives to convert 
customary land into registered title. The gov-
ernment and government officials are also 
tied into this framework of incentives with the 
result that a relatively simple system for the 
registration of leases over customary land 
has been set up. Flaws in this system com-
bined with imbalances of power between the 
landowners (who are generally unfamiliar and 
ill equipped to deal with the formal system) 
and investors (who are often experts in it) 
mean the formalisation of land tenure gives 
rise to complaints of exploitation and postco-
lonialist land-grabs.
At the same time, the Constitution of 
Vanuatu is proudly affirmative that the ‘rules 
of custom shall form the basis of ownership 
and use of land’ (Const. art. 74) and that only 
‘indigenous citizens … shall have perpetu-
al ownership of their land’ (Const. art. 75). 
There is therefore a substantial gap between 
the law as it is stated and how it is practically 
applied in managing land transactions. 
This paper is focused on the formal sys-
tem rather than the customary system. That 
is, the role and position of the formal system 
toward the customary land brought within its 
ambit in this legally pluralistic society rather 
than the possibilities, problems and potenti-
alities that customary land tenure offers. As 
such it does not purport to be a comprehen-
sive or even coherent analysis of customary 
land tenure.
The interaction of the customary and 
formal land tenure systems often has neg-
ative consequences, such as disposses-
sion of customary owners and deterrence 
of investors. Neither system properly under-
stands the other. Well-intentioned individuals 
become frustrated at the opacity of the ‘other’ 
system, while malicious individuals are able 
to exploit the lack of commonalities for ille-
gitimate gains. This paper seeks to highlight 
critical ‘points of contact’ between the formal 
and customary systems and to note some of 
the impacts these issues have for customary 
landholders.2
Beginning with the Constitution, expand-
ing ripples of implementing legislation, politi-
cal leadership, practices of land adminis-
tration, and certain prejudices within the 
operation of the private sector mean that 
Vanuatu has struggled to find equitable paths 
to realise its commitment to custom. 
The Constitution is central to understand-
ing issues within the formal system, and at 
the same time may offer the best hope of 
resolving many difficulties. The role of the 
legal framework it establishes is the focus of 
the first section. The second section looks at 
the process of registering land, in particular 
how certain procedural inadequacies allow 
the intent of legislation to be circumvented. 
The third section suggests that problems 
deriving from the preceding parts are com-
pounded by ‘soft prejudices’ that confuse and 
undermine customary-owner negotiations. 
These last are among the least understood 
aspects (certainly in the literature) but also 
perhaps the most important. 
The information in this report was compiled 
through discussions with government officials, 
private sector professionals and academics 
working in the Vanuatu land sector, together 
with an analysis of legislation and court deci-
sions, and a desk review of relevant academic 
literature. This report is written without refer-
ence to the Government of Vanuatu’s com-
prehensive ‘Vanuatu Land Sector Framework 
2009–2018’, which had not been approved 
at time of research. Grateful mention is also 
made of excellent research materials pro-
duced under AusAID- and NZAid-funded proj-
ects whose substantive activities were due to 
begin at time of writing.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK
Immediate challenges post-Independence of 
reconciling the return of land to customary 
ownership with protecting (foreign-owned) 
agricultural production
The return of land to customary owners, man-
dated by the Constitution, raised a number 
of practical issues; most notably identifying 
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ary owners were unclear, the LRA gave the 
Minister of Lands ‘general management and 
control’ (LRA s. 8(1)), including the power 
to grant leases over the disputed land (Van 
Trease 1987).
Although the Constitution aspired to a 
land system based on custom, the return of 
land to customary ownership lead to a more 
immediate priority — namely establishing a 
system to deal with ‘re-leasing’ transactions 
of alienated land back to the alienators to 
continue agricultural production. The fathers 
of the Constitution, in common with many 
postcolonial states, had to balance a vision 
for the future with the immediate demands of 
politics and the economy. In the tumult of pre-
Independence nation building, the challenge 
of designing a coherent land tenure system 
out of the multiplicity, fluidity, and sheer ‘oth-
erness’ of custom from any available prec-
edent legislation, was assigned to a ‘national 
land law’ (Const. art. 76) and to parliament.
The Constitution did not prevent the issu-
ance of leases4 to foreigners (although only 
indigenous citizens could own freehold title) 
but it was greatly concerned that such leases 
should be fair to customary owners. Govern-
ment had to consent to all leases of land to 
foreigners and this consent was to be with-
held if the transaction was prejudicial to the 
interests of customary owners, the commu-
nity in whose locality the land was situated, 
other indigenous citizens, or the Republic of 
Vanuatu. It was a sensible recognition of the 
power imbalances that still characterise land 
negotiations between indigenous ni-Vanuatu 
and foreigners.
The legal framework for the newly inde-
pendent republic was therefore character-
ised by three features:
i) implementing legislation designed to 
manage the return of land to customary 
ownership (and reconversion to lease-
hold if required), and which included 
strong powers for the Minister of Lands to 
manage this process
ii) a permanent government power to 
approve or reject transactions between 
ni-Vanuatu and foreigners (and citizens 
of foreign extraction)
these owners. Many plantations and urban 
areas had been long established, erasing the 
markers that distinguished customary land 
boundaries. Missionaries had collected dif-
ferent groups of people from their lands and 
into coastal villages, while others were drawn 
toward the attractions of colonial administra-
tive centres. Following contact with Europe-
ans, a series of epidemics swept the islands, 
killing up to 95% of the population on some 
(Speiser 1923). Furthermore, land is not nec-
essarily inherited by direct lineage in Vanuatu 
custom and there are many ways, other than 
by descent, that people could claim land. The 
drafters of the Constitution were fully aware 
that by formally returning all land to the cus-
tomary owners they were unleashing a range 
of disputes and uncertainties to which there 
was no quick solution.
At Independence in 1980, Vanuatu was 
economically dependent on agricultural pro-
duction. The government was intent on pre-
venting the plantations from collapsing into 
disputes and carefully considered the man-
agement of the return to customary owner-
ship. Thus article 78(1) of the Constitution 
provides that:
Where, consequent on the provisions of 
this Chapter, there is a dispute concern-
ing the ownership of alienated land, the 
Government shall hold such land until the 
dispute is resolved.
Under the Land Reform Act 1980 (LRA) 
passed to handle this transition,3 the expa-
triates, known as alienators, were entitled 
to remain on their land until either a lease 
was agreed or they were compensated. To 
qualify, they had to be in physical possession 
of their land ‘immediately prior to the Day of 
Independence’ (this excluded the expatriates 
who had abandoned their properties) and 
the land had to be ‘maintained in reasonably 
good repair’ (LRA s. 1) excluding claims to 
swathes of undeveloped bush land. If the 
appropriate customary owners could not be 
identified, perhaps because of disputes, then 
the minister could appoint a trustee on their 
behalf. Further, in cases where expatriate 
alienators had vacated their land (many had 
left the country or been deported following 
abortive secession attempts) and the custom-
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iii) the unrealised promise of a national land 
law based on custom to replace a land 
tenure system based on colonial tenets.
Broadly, the failure to promulgate ii) and iii) 
has facilitated the misuse of powers in i).
Failure to limit the Minister of Lands’ 
power to deal in disputed land to the 
parameters set in the ‘temporary’ 
legislation
Because the legal framework described 
above was intended to manage the transfer 
of land in a transitional period, one would 
expect there to have been a glut of leases 
signed by the Minister of Lands on behalf 
of disputing customary owners immediately 
after Independence, and that this number 
would tail away as leases were agreed with 
alienators and as customary owners resolved 
disputed ownership and took responsibility 
for their own lease negotiations, albeit under 
the supervision of government. In fact the 
reverse is true. As set out in Figure 1, the 
number of leases signed by the minister 
remained relatively low for the first decade 
after Independence. As Vanuatu entered 
the 1990s, however, the numbers of leases 
signed by Ministers of Lands began to climb.
Figure 1 Leases signed by ministers, 1980–2000
Source: calculated from Farran (2002)
Research into leases granted over the 
island of Efate show that 22% (223) of all 
leases granted for the island of Efate from 
1980 to 2000 were signed by various Minis-
ters of Lands, and 80% of this number was 
signed between 1990 and 2000. Following 
the recent property boom, the number is now 
likely to be substantially higher (Farran 2002).
As Figure 1 shows, the number of leases 
has increased dramatically. There are two 
apparent reasons for this. Firstly, many of the 
disputes between customary owners over 
land alienated before Independence were 
never resolved. As this land became more 
valuable in the course of the tourism boom 
of the 1990s the determination of the dispu-
tants became more entrenched: ‘It has been 
stated that 100% of unsuccessful litigants in 
land matters currently exercise their right of 
appeal to the Supreme Court’ (Hardy-Pick-
ering 1997). Thus many disputes between 
customary owners deriving from the return 
of alienated land remain active, not least 
the dispute over who owns (i.e. should have 
received the compensation for) the capital, 
Port Vila. Even so, one would expect such 
disputes to decline gradually as the courts 
worked through them and, concomitantly, a 
decline in the number of leases signed by the 
Ministers of Lands.
A second explanation for the ongoing 
activity of the minister in issuing leases is 
that the power to sign leases where custom-
ary owners are in dispute is being used more 
broadly than the legislation intends. Consti-
tutional article 78(1), set out above, clearly 
restricts this power to alienated land. The 
implementing legislation is less clear. Sec-
tion 8 of the LRA states:
8. (1) The Minister shall have general 
management and control over all land
(a) occupied by alienators where 
either there is no approved 
agreement in accordance 
with sections 6 or 7 or the 
ownership is disputed; or
(b) not occupied by an alienator 
but where ownership is 
disputed; or
(c) not occupied by an alienator, 
and which in the opinion of 
the Minister is inadequately 
maintained.
Section 8(1)(b) does not specifically state 
what type of land it relates to, and as the 
heading clause refers to all land, it has been 
taken that subclause (b) refers to both cus-
tomary and alienated land and consequently 
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that the Minister of Lands has a power to 
grant leases over any customary land that is 
disputed. 
This expansive interpretation, however, 
would seem to exceed the power granted 
in the Constitution, which refers only to the 
power of the minister with regard to alienated 
land. It would also appear to be contrary to 
the purpose and circumstances surround-
ing the enactment of the LRA, which, as 
discussed above, was drafted as a response 
to the post-Independence return of alien-
ated land to customary owners. Moreover, 
the expansive interpretation of the minister’s 
power is difficult to derive even from a close 
literal reading of the text as is made clearer if 
the phrase is preceded with the different type 
of land:
8. (1) The Minister shall have general 
management and control over all:
[alienated land] not occupied by an 
alienator or
[customary land] not occupied by an 
alienator.
Drawn out in this fashion, the clause 
doesn’t seem to make sense when applied 
to customary land, as there is no sensible 
reason why an alienator would occupy such 
land — indeed a person occupying custom-
ary land is by definition not an alienator (at 
least with regard to that land).5
A limited view of the minister’s power 
(to sign leases only over alienated land) is 
supported by a growing body of academic 
opinion (see Lunnay et al. 2007, Regenvanu 
2008); however, the expansive view is still 
used in practice.
To summarise, a close analysis of the 
legislation suggests that the Minister of Lands 
has a power to sign leases only over land that 
was alienated at the time of Independence 
and does not have a power to sign leases 
over disputed customary land. Use of the 
power in this more expansive form would be 
open to challenge in the courts.
Lack of a definition of disputed land 
allows any trivial claim to trigger the 
minister’s power
If the Minister of Lands is using his power to 
grant leases over customary land in ‘dispute’, 
it is relevant to consider what a ‘dispute’ is. 
There is no definition in any of the legislation 
as to what criteria must be fulfilled for land 
to be disputed, and no threshold to exclude 
minor disputes. In short, under the current 
interpretation of the law anyone can claim 
a right to land, thereby create a dispute and 
trigger the power of the Minister of Lands to 
grant a lease over the land.
The consequences of this legislative 
omission are exaggerated because of the 
nature of landholding in the customary sys-
tem, which incorporates fluid, exchangeable 
rights of use. ‘Ownership’ is often portrayed 
as an intruding foreign concept (‘landholding’ 
being a preferred term for custom propo-
nents), while rights to land can be inherited 
through male and female lines, membership 
of a naflak,6 by working land or contributing 
to a community, or by other means specific 
to customary areas (Crocombe 1995, Fingle-
ton et al. 2008, Rodman 1995, Van Trease 
1987). With so many possible rights-holders, 
disputes are likely, particularly when a trans-
action offers the prospect of a windfall.
There is no statutory requirement7 for a 
Minister of Lands to identify the dispute that 
permits the exercise of his power. In the 
example in Box 1 (page 6), no attempt to do 
so was made.
It is difficult to evaluate how many of the 
disputes that are used to trigger the minister’s 
power are caused by trivial claims involving 
‘have-a-go’ claimants. It is also difficult to 
distinguish disputes in which disputants do 
not want the land leased, from those in which 
the disputants are contesting for the right to 
lease out the land. The central issue, really, 
is that it does not matter what the customary 
owners want. In the case of disputes (which 
are often present and easily triggered), the 
Minister of Lands has been able to step in 
and lease the land without anyone’s consent.
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The obligation to act in the interests 
of customary owners
The only additional limitation on the minister’s 
power to deal in disputed land is the obliga-
tion in the LRA (s. 8(2)(c)) to:
take all necessary measures to conserve 
and protect the land on behalf of the 
custom owners.
Section 8(2)(b) states also that leases must 
be in the interests of customary owners.
The law contains no further explanation 
of what is in a customary owners’ interest 
nor does it suggest a process for ascer-
taining it. A similar constitutional provision 
(Const. art. 76(2)) that transactions must not 
be prejudicial to the interests of customary 
owner, community, or nation reinforces the 
law but does not clarify how customary own-
ers’ interests should be established, nor what 
should be done if a lease is demonstrably not 
in their interest.
Case law fills this gap to an extent. Under 
the LRA (s. 100), the only grounds for rec-
tifying the register of leases are ‘fraud or 
mistake’ in its creation. This has been inter-
preted by the courts to deal with leases that 
derive from situations of manifest injustice. 
The courts have held that some ministers 
have made ‘mistakes’; for example, by failing 
to take into account injunctions against the 
creation of leases (Roqara v. Takau [2005] 
VUCA 5), or by failing to ‘lawfully, properly or 
validly exercise the powers of the Minister of 
Lands’ (Ifira Trustees Ltd v. Family Kalsakau 
[2006] VUCA 23). Most recently, the Supreme 
Court in the Lelepa case decided that a min-
ister had made a ‘mistake of ignoring his duty 
to properly consult’ with a customary owner:
It can hardly be acting in the interests of 
a custom land owner to grant a 75 year 
lease of his land without even consulting 
the presumptive owner, particularly when 
he had made it clear to the minister that he 
did not want a lease granted. 
(Solomon v. Turquoise Ltd [2008] VUSC 64)
However, the case did make clear that 
for a minister to consult and for a minister to 
act according to the views expressed were 
different matters. The judge in Solomon v. 
Turquoise Ltd goes on to comment: ‘the Min-
ister’s attitude was such that he would have 
ignored [the customary owner’s] opposition 
and granted the lease anyway’. It seems 
there is a distinction in Vanuatu law between 
knowing the wishes of a customary owner 
and acting in their best interests.
Moves to limit the power of the 
Minister of Lands
The exercise of a power to grant leases over 
land without the consent of the customary 
owners has caused great anger in Vanuatu, 
and is probably the single most contentious 
issue in a subject that causes great ran-
cour. A National Land Summit held in 2006 
resolved to remove this power. The National 
Land Summit resolutions were adopted by 
the Council of Ministers but this particular 
resolution was amended to allow grants over 
disputed land ‘used for public interest’ (COM 
2006). It is not clear if this is meant to mean 
the power is restricted to when land is need-
ed for public use (‘the Government may own 
BOX 1: THE GOLDEN BEACH LAND DISPUTE
Valuable beachfront land had been the subject of a customary land dispute that 
was resolved in a Customary Land Tribunal. During 2007, the Department of Lands 
officer received a request to process a ‘disputed land’ lease that was being created 
independently by the Minister of Lands. Due to understaffing, the lands officer was also 
acting as the Customary Land Tribunal officer, and he recognised that the land under 
question had had its dispute resolved long ago. The customary owners were able to 
file for a court order stopping the registration of the lease. If it had not been for the 
serendipitous involvement of the lands officer in both cases the land would likely have 
been registered under a lease without the knowledge, until too late, of the customary 
owner (Iercet v. Naliupis [2009] VUSC 5).
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land in the public interest’ — Const. art. 80) or 
if it is simply a restatement of the already cur-
rent position in the law and the Constitution 
stated above. The first interpretation would 
make most sense.8
In the November 2008 session of par-
liament, a Private Member’s Bill sought to 
remove the minister’s power by legislative 
amendment but the Bill was rejected on the 
grounds that disputes must not hinder devel-
opment, an argument that recalls the earliest 
days of Independence.
Based on the discussion above, at least 
three strong arguments could be put forward 
to challenge a lease entered into by the min-
ister: (i) that the minister’s power only applies 
to alienated land; (ii) that there is not in fact 
a dispute or the dispute is trivial or unsub-
stantiated; and (iii) that the lease is not in the 
customary owner’s interest.
Land cases are clearly receiving judicial 
attention in the courts. It is therefore a matter 
of some curiosity that the limitations of the 
existing legislation seem not to have been 
explored with a view to better controlling the 
expansive fashion in which some ministers 
have exercised their power to deal in custom-
ary land. 
REGISTERING CUSTOMARY LAND
Comparing the common law ‘chain 
of title’ system with the customary 
oral history system but contrasting 
the lack of diligence in verifying 
customary rights-holders
Before the introduction of the Torrens sys-
tem,9 the common law system required proof 
of ownership of land by ‘chain of title’, which 
represented the collected title deeds stretch-
ing back, ideally, to the first grant of land 
by the Crown. Apart from the obvious dif-
ference that one is written down and the 
other recounted orally, there are similarities 
between this system and custom. There is a 
large degree of uncertainty in both systems; 
ownership in both depends on tracing the 
‘story’ as far back as possible through his-
tory and, in both, verifying title requires great 
effort and is time consuming. Both are also 
prone to introduction of new, often fraudulent, 
claims along the ‘chain’. 
In relation to both unregistered land under 
common law, and customary land, posses-
sion is good evidence of title. In custom, for 
example, rights of use are easily given and 
rights to land can be earned by working it 
(Bonnemaison 1984:2). Therefore, in both, 
physical verification of land is very important. 
In the common law system, a purchaser of 
unregistered land is expected to check land 
boundaries and landmarks to verify plans 
and to ask questions about, for example, the 
status of people obviously living on the land, 
fishing rights if there was a river and rights of 
access if there was a path.
Because of the weaknesses of the com-
mon law system, and the indefeasibility of 
title in the Torrens system, great care was 
taken in western countries when converting 
unregistered title deeds to registered (Tor-
rens) title. The basic principle in common law 
is ‘buyer beware’.
Under common law, a purchaser of unreg-
istered land (comparable to customary-owned 
land) who did not have notice of a third par-
ty’s interest (such as the existence of rights 
of use or other owners of a group) would take 
the land free from those interests. In return, 
however, the purchaser is expected to make 
reasonable efforts to verify the existence of 
any third party rights; they will be subject to 
interests they would have known about had 
they taken reasonable measures to find out.10 
For this reason, purchasers make thorough 
investigations of other possible interests (Far-
ran & Paterson 2004).
These principles also exist in Vanuatu 
legislation. In common with other systems 
that allow registration of interests in land, the 
Land Leases Act 1984 (LLA) states that:
The rights of a proprietor of a registered 
interest [e.g. a lease] … shall be held … 
free from all other interests and claims 
whatsoever. (s. 15)
However, registration can be cancelled or 
amended if the proprietor:
… had knowledge of the omission, fraud or 
mistake … or caused such omission, fraud 
or mistake or substantially contributed to 
The Interaction of Modern and Custom Land Tenure Systems in Vanuatu
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it by his act, neglect or default. (s. 100(2), 
emphasis added)
In Vanuatu the practice appears to be to 
apply the first rule, but not the safeguard even 
though failing to properly verify the customary 
owners would seem to be a ‘substantial con-
tribution’ to the mistake or omission of enter-
ing either incorrect or insufficient customary 
owners on the Register of Leases, with the 
result that such leases could be nullified.
Why the state erroneously appears 
to have assumed responsibility for 
verifying customary ownership
The only formal investigation of ownership 
is undertaken by the Department of Lands 
using a form known as the Custom Owner 
Identification Form,11 which is signed by a 
chief. This has several implications. Firstly, it 
means that yet another step in the process of 
leasing land can take place without the cus-
tomary owners’ participation or consent. Sec-
ondly, it gives the chiefs an effective veto over 
land transactions. And thirdly, it raises ques-
tions over who are the appropriate chiefs 
and what interests they have, there being no 
process to verify the correct chief has signed, 
that they have correctly identified the cus-
tomary owner, or the land has been properly 
delineated. The implications of disputed titles 
of chiefs are clear in these circumstances.12
The Interim Transitional Implementation 
Strategy of the 2006 National Land Summit 
Resolutions adopted by the Council of Min-
isters (COM 2006) required that information 
about Custom Owner Identification Forms be 
advertised in a public place and discussed in 
public meetings (with minutes submitted to 
the Department of Lands) before their inclu-
sion in the lease registration process.13 This 
demonstrates the improvements that can 
be made on an administrative level. At the 
same time, the lack of resources to support 
or verify the process and the lack of provision 
for enforcement or penalty in case of omis-
sion demonstrate the follow-up support that 
is needed once such administrative require-
ments are introduced.14
Another noteworthy aspect of the LLA 
relates to Certificates of Negotiation estab-
lished to realise the constitutional provision 
that the government control the issue of 
leases to foreigners (Const. art. 79(1)).
No alienator or other person may enter 
into negotiations with any custom owners 
concerning land unless he applies to the 
minister and receives a certificate from the 
minister that he is a registered negotiator. 
(S. 6(1), emphasis added)
Authorisation to ‘enter into negotiations’ 
is very different to consenting to the final 
transaction. The Certificate of Negotiation 
is another interim measure that has been 
perpetuated; it was originally intended to 
manage the ‘return and re-lease’ of land 
at Independence. Now it is generally seen 
as the procedural safeguard implementing 
the constitutional requirement that consent 
should not be given to leases that are preju-
dicial to the interests of the customary owner, 
community or nation (Const. art. 79(2)). This 
is a misconception; the certificate cannot pro-
vide a safeguard against prejudicial leases as 
leases are substantively negotiated after the 
approval of the certificate.
The Certificate of Negotiation specifies 
the customary owner as identified through the 
Custom Owner Identification Form. Since in 
theory this is the first step of the land transac-
tion (the Certificate of Negotiation is a permis-
sion to begin negotiations) it seems to have 
become the view that through the Custom 
Owner Identification Form process the state 
has guaranteed the identity of the customary 
owners and thus freed the purchaser (lessee) 
of the need to check if there are other claims 
to the land. In fact, however, nothing in the 
legislation frees the purchaser from the need 
to check for other claims. Neither the form nor 
the Certificate of Negotiation should be seen 
as a guarantee that the lessor is in fact the 
true owner of the land in question and vigilant 
purchasers have scope in the course of sub-
sequent negotiations to properly verify title. 
In short, a purchaser who does not properly 
verify title should be subject to reasonably 
verifiable interests that appear afterwards.
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The benefits of not properly verifying 
customary owners and explaining the 
relative absence of contested leases 
in a context of inequitable lease 
creation
In common law, if a seller turns out not to 
have owned the land he sold, the transac-
tion would be void under the principle that 
one cannot sell what one does not own.15 
The extension of this principle to Vanuatu, 
where the issues are more complex and the 
likelihood of excluded rights-holders greater, 
would mean that purchasers/lessees should 
be proportionately more careful in ascertain-
ing that the persons they are negotiating 
with are true customary owners with rights 
to conduct the transaction proposed. In fact, 
the basic level of care that is taken by pur-
chasers of unregistered land in England is 
not taken by lessees of customary land in 
Vanuatu as there is little to lose and much 
to gain by not trying to fully verify customary 
ownership. Why this is, goes to the heart of 
the power imbalance between customary 
owners and the (often foreign) lessees of 
their land.
The ultimate cost of failing to verify custom-
ary owners for a lessee is to have their lease 
nullified in court. However, comparatively few 
court challenges are made against lessees by 
excluded customary rights-holders. The Valu-
er General also has a power to forfeit leases 
where there has been a breach of terms or 
conditions within a lease, not when a lease is 
created through fraud or mistake; those cases 
go to the Supreme Court (Menzies Samuel, 
Valuer General, pers. comm. July 2009).16 
This means that cases where promises may 
have been made but which were not included 
as conditions in a lease do not come under 
the authority of the Valuer General. 
Some flagrant appropriations of land that 
did not accurately identify customary owners 
have been set aside but in practice the usual 
remedy to a successful ownership challenge 
is to amend the owner’s name on the Reg-
ister of Leases after a decision in a court or 
tribunal (Director of Lands, pers. comm.). 
Thus the lease will still stand even though 
the confirmed customary owner may not have 
negotiated it.
One reason for this is that many customary 
owners are actually quite eager to lease their 
land. Notwithstanding areas and islands of 
high population density and land scarcity, cur-
rently there is more agricultural land available 
than is needed to grow food. Vanuatu’s popu-
lation has still not recovered from the series 
of epidemics that decimated the population in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
If foreigners wish to lease underutilised and 
cyclone-vulnerable beachfront land then why 
not lease it to them? Even low rents are likely 
to pay more income and certainly require less 
work than copra production.
A rights-holder excluded from a lease is 
more likely to be seeking to secure the rents 
from the lease than to set it aside. Custom-
ary owners should be free to decide whether 
and how to lease their land, just as purchas-
ers should properly verify the rights-holders. 
Where this has not happened, the desire to 
secure rents makes it much easier to negoti-
ate one’s way out of difficulty and may explain 
why so few leases, comparatively, are chal-
lenged in the courts. 
At the same time, there is a clear vulner-
ability in refusing to lease land. As noted, the 
chance of windfall payments may precipitate 
disputes within a group, which allows the 
Minister of Lands to step in and execute a 
lease over the heads of contesting rights-
holders. Alternatively, with a weak process 
for verification of ownership, someone within 
the group may simply lease the land without 
the consent of other rights-holders. Once 
the lease has been signed, the other rights-
holders are in a difficult position. Many of 
these transactions should be seen as driven 
by tenure insecurity. 
It is comparatively easy to contest custom-
ary ownership of land. Evidence of land rights 
rests on the fact of possession, and oral 
traditions that can be falsified or contested, 
particularly in peri-urban areas where land is 
most valuable and historically most distanced 
from customary ownership. At the same time, 
it is relatively difficult to conclusively estab-
lish (or disprove) ownership. To set aside a 
lease is a lengthy and expensive process at 
the end of which the courts will require very 
strong evidence to overturn what has become 
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a presumption that the person who executed 
the lease had the power to do so. 
Put more simply, asserting ownership 
of customary land is easy; proving that a 
lease was granted by the wrong person is 
extremely difficult. The burden has therefore 
shifted from the purchaser to verify title and 
onto the customary owner to prove own-
ership. With the requisite awareness and 
financial resources, it is possible to prevent 
a lease from becoming an immutable reality 
with rapid and determined legal action. In 
the circumstances, it is easier by far to take 
some money, amend the register, and join 
the lease.
Concepts of customary land tenure 
that affect the formal land registration 
process
This paper is limited to reviewing how the for-
mal system manages customary land brought 
within its ambit. Clearly, differences between 
the formal system and the customary system 
lie at the heart of these problems. Although 
this paper uses certain terms about custom 
(such as ‘chief’ and ‘customary owner’) it 
should not be thought that such terms neces-
sarily represent custom. Rather, these terms 
represent the formal (previously colonial) 
system’s attempt to grapple with these con-
cepts. These attempts may be summarised 
as a translation of complex social systems 
into labels useful and meaningful within the 
formal system. Translation of this nature is 
probably intrinsically misleading and vulner-
able to disputes. 
Custom land tenure is notable for its mul-
tiple and flexible land-use rights that individu-
als claim through their ‘egocentric personal 
networks’ (Golub 2007:83). It is probably nei-
ther desirable nor possible for such complex 
socially based rights to be represented in the 
relatively static device of a registered lease. 
These are not simply issues of poor transla-
tion between the two systems. Golub argues 
that seeking to represent customary tenets as 
formal system legal entities has a transforma-
tive effect on customary social structures (see 
Box 2). The formal system allows for a great 
variety of interests and subsidiary land rights 
but this does not mean that they are equiva-
lent with customary land rights. In the formal 
system, rights are relatively static, limited in 
number and seen as being attached to the 
land even while the rights-holders change. 
In the customary system land rights attach 
to the person, meaning that the number of 
rights-holders can increase as the population 
linked to that land grows. Further study is 
needed to clarify where and to what extent an 
equivalence can be found between the sub-
sidiary rights of the two systems. However, in 
most registered leases in Vanuatu there is no 
representation of custom or any subsidiary 
rights at all. This points more to power imbal-
ances between the two systems than any 
inadequacy in the formal system to describe 
these rights.
Tension between the Ministry of 
Lands’ role as a disinterested keeper 
of records and the constitutional 
(but undefined) duty to ensure 
transactions are in the best interests 
of the customary owners
The Department of Lands has received sub-
stantial criticism in recent years for its failure 
to protect customary-owned land and control 
development through the enforcement of 
planning provisions and other safeguards. 
Many of the problems confronting the Depart-
ment of Lands, however, are simply not 
within its power to resolve. The Department 
of Lands has no way of knowing if, in a cus-
tomary system, a chief would be allowed to 
sell land nor which chief can rightfully exer-
cise land administration powers, challenges 
that the National Council of Chiefs itself has 
been unable to resolve. The Department of 
Lands could refuse to register a lease on the 
grounds that other rights-holders had been 
excluded, but which rights should trigger 
this power? At what point does a weak right 
become a fraudulent claim? While to some 
these questions may be matters of ethno-
graphic curiosity, to the Department of Lands 
they are genuine and recurring administrative 
challenges. 
Many problems can also be attributed 
to under-resourcing. There are long delays 
associated with registering leases due to the 
limited capacity of staff using limited technol-
ogy and overwhelmed with a huge backlog. 
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A recent AusAID-funded study noted sub-
stantial arrears in rent collection, an important 
source of revenue for government.17 Units 
that are responsible for environment impact 
assessments, verification of customary own-
ers, and land surveys respectively, have 
important roles to play in supporting custom-
ary owners in the lease process but are simi-
larly under-resourced for the demands placed 
on them (Lunnay et al. 2007: Att.7; Hassall & 
Associates 2008:44).18
Normally, a lands registry is a neutral, 
disinterested institution that guarantees land 
titles but does not guarantee the fairness of 
the preceding land transactions. It is seen as 
a facilitator rather than an engaged enforcer. 
In Vanuatu, though, the Constitution and 
the transitional legislation have introduced 
an evaluative element to the process: land 
transactions involving customary land have 
to be in the interests of the customary own-
ers, community, and wider national interest. 
However, there was little guidance given in 
the legislation as to how to effect this. The 
LLA detailed how leases should be registered 
but not how they should be assessed. The 
Department of Lands has not been given 
any political guidance on how to engage in 
the process and little has been done to move 
the culture of the department toward a more 
interventionist, protective stance (Steven 
Tahi, pers. comm.).
BOX 2: LOST IN TRANSLATION
Customary owner
The formal system demands ‘a custom 
owner’ sign a lease while custom itself 
can only provide a group of rights-holders. 
More important than ‘ownership’ (which is 
in a sense immutable), in a society based 
on shifting cultivation, are multiple land-
use rights that can be distributed among 
groups and individuals maintaining broad 
networks of social ties. Although user 
rights and rights-holders are multiple, the 
land itself is represented by a patriarch. 
When a patriarch sells land he becomes 
identified as the customary owner and 
gains something he never had; an exclu-
sive right to possession that excludes 
all of the other rights-holders. Thus the 
formal system’s demand for a customary 
owner is inherently fraught.
Chiefs
Traditional (i.e. pre-contact with the West) 
Melanesian societies appear to have con-
sisted of scattered groups variously led by 
people responsible for different activities: 
leaders for warfare, sorcery, rituals, dif-
ferent forms of food production, etc. The 
colonial administration ‘organised’ these 
groups into villages under the charge of 
an appointed chief. Disputes over chiefly 
titles are rife in Vanuatu.
Many interviewees noted that tradi-
tional chiefly powers extended to social 
organisation rather than land manage-
ment. Under the current system, chiefs 
identify customary owners of land, veto 
leases over that land, and assign owner-
ship where there is a dispute. While ‘chief’ 
may appear to be a traditional concept, 
the position and powers of the modern-
day title may be very different from their 
traditional role.
Group ownership
The complexities of what might loosely be 
termed group ownership are cultural per-
spectives as to the degree of control over 
land between the chief and the group, 
and the group and the individual. Where 
custom ‘ownership’ lies along the complex 
continuum from group to individual is hotly 
contested and possibly unanswerable. 
The formal system has largely disregard-
ed such complexities, preferring to iden-
tify, validly or not, a single owner who can 
give exclusive possession (Bolton 1999, 
Bonnemaison 1984, Crocombe 2006, 
Rodman 1995).
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The opposite is rather the case. Instead of 
signing leases in the best interests of custom-
ary owners, certain ministers are known to 
have signed leases for their own self-enrich-
ment (Vanuatu Daily Post 2009; Radio New 
Zealand 2007; Office of the Ombudsman 
1998a, 1998b, 1999). Corrupt political lead-
ership undermines civil service institutions. 
Under it honest officials become disillusioned 
while those disposed to self-enrichment can 
take advantage of an atmosphere of impunity. 
Small countries are particularly vulnerable 
to an unhealthy meshing of business and 
political interests. In Vanuatu, there is some-
thing of a ‘culture of cronyism’ that includes 
intimidation of lower-ranking officials by pur-
chasers and developers seeking to bluster 
transactions past long delays caused by 
understaffing and lack of technology (Depart-
ment of Lands officials, pers. comm.).
There is a discernable tension between 
Department of Lands officials and their politi-
cal leaders that comes out in court cases 
challenging the decisions of ministers to sign 
leases:
He [the judge] found they [Lands officials] 
had made a principle and courageous 
stand on this matter when they expressed 
their concerns about the irregularity in 
the process for the issue of the Plaintiff’s 
lease.
(Peter Bouchard v. Director of Land 
Records [2003] VUCA 5)
Positive and strong political leadership 
is required if Department of Lands officials 
are going to take an interventionist stance 
when customary owners wish to sell, or if 
they are going to take on well-moneyed, well-
connected and combative developers who 
circumvent regulations. It would be consistent 
with the law for the Department of Lands to 
be more assertive in the execution of its duty 
to protect customary owners. To do this, the 
Department of Lands needs guidance on 
how protective the government should be in 
carrying out its constitutional responsibility to 
ensure leases are in customary owners’ best 
interests. Once the political will and direction 
is expressed, officials can develop processes 
that implement the political lead.
Weaknesses in the lease registration 
process
The Certificate of Negotiation was intended 
as a permission to begin negotiations. At 
this point, information about the transaction 
is necessarily scanty and it is not possible 
to judge how fair a lease will be. At present, 
the issue of a certificate is taken as official 
approval of a transaction event although ele-
ments that are critical to how fair a transac-
tion is occur after the issue of the certificate. 
Just as the Custom Owner Identifica-
tion Form (a component of the Certificate of 
Negotiation process) has supplanted proper 
verification of customary ownership on the 
part of the purchaser, so the process of issu-
ing a Certificate of Negotiation is assumed 
to fulfil the government’s obligations to only 
approve leases that are in a customary 
owner’s best interest. But since critical ele-
ments such as the negotiation of the lease 
and the land survey occur after the issue of a 
certificate it cannot do this. This constitutional 
obligation remains to be introduced into the 
lease registration process. Although the final 
lease is sent to the State Law Office this is 
only for confirmation that it complies with 
legal requirements.
A further problem running through the 
leasing process is the latitude the Minister 
of Lands has. For all leases he will approve 
both the Certificate of Negotiation and the 
entry of the lease into the Register of Leases; 
for many others (around 20% according to 
Farran 2002) he will also be the lessor. This 
gives rise to conflicts of interest, real and 
perceived, that Department of Lands officials 
find difficult to manage. Institutions such as 
the State Law Office or Ombudman’s Office 
are either unable or unwilling to challenge 
ministers who act outside their powers.19 
The freedom of ministers to act with impunity 
coupled with the administration logjam of pro-
cessing leases means that completion of land 
transactions depends on political connections 
rather than procedures. This undermines 
efforts to manage administration and enforce 
compliance impartially and effectively.
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POSITION OF CUSTOMARY 
OWNERS IN THE LEASE 
PROCESS
This section sets out some of the issues 
confronting customary owners who seek to 
‘sell’ their land; that is, those who negotiate a 
lease that will convert their customary-owned 
land into a registered lease. It is perfectly 
possible to lease customary-owned land in 
Vanuatu without the consent of the custom-
ary owner, either through the Minister of 
Lands’ power to deal in disputed land or by 
signing with a different purported customary 
owner and riding out the consequences. But 
in most cases customary owners willingly or 
even proactively seek to lease their land in 
an attempt to realise cash from irregularly 
used and financially unproductive coast or 
bushland to meet the demands of the cash 
economy.
BOX 3: GAUA ISLAND — POWERLESS TO PREVENT
An ex-Member of Parliament from a migrant community acted as a middleman on behalf 
of a Vanuatu-born investor of foreign origin. Four individuals from landowning families 
on the island were flown to Port Vila and entertained. The objective was to negotiate the 
lease of 10,000 hectares for a cattle plantation. Apparently no papers were signed but 
soon afterwards several surveys were conducted and large numbers of migrant workers 
began clearing the forest. 
The customary landowners have no idea how to legally prevent the clearance going 
ahead. The middleman is a local ‘big-man’ with good connections to the political estab-
lishment. The islanders want development. The land provides a useful food-bank for 
hunting and collection of wild foods, but it is not producing cash income. The community 
wishes to participate in a partnership or joint venture (‘50:50’) but there has been no 
negotiation in which they can put their views across and they have little idea how such 
a joint venture would be formed. Several surveys were conducted, but without consulta-
tion with customary owners. Some of the customary owners are in favour of the project, 
while others are not, creating conditions for a dispute.
The economy on Gaua generates little cash locally. The people have put their hope 
in the Environment Impact Assessment and in the Certificate of Negotiation as they 
understand these to provide statutory protection against abuses in the leasing process; 
however, neither of these will help negotiate a good lease. Meanwhile, forest clearance 
continues. Once the land has been cleared there will be no point in not agreeing a lease. 
Gaua has several notable tourist attractions and it is common practice to convert agri-
cultural leases to residential or tourism once the land has been removed from custom-
ary ownership. Although they own the land, the people of Gaua have lost control of it.
That customary owners (or a patriarchal 
representative) willingly engage in negotia-
tions does not isolate them from the issues 
described in the previous sections. It means, 
instead, that negotiations take place in a con-
text of prevailing tenure insecurity which make 
protracted negotiations and public marketing 
of land risky and create incentives for secre-
tive or suboptimal transactions. A customary 
owner must be assertive in establishing their 
rights should other purported customary own-
ers appear or if a dispute presents itself and 
the Minister of Lands intervenes (Section 1); 
they must be self-reliant in the absence of any 
government intervention subsequent to the 
issue of the Certificate of Negotiation that will 
protect their interests (Section 2); and they 
must be sophisticated in accessing the best 
advice to assist them in their negotiations 
(this section). Unfortunately, these are quali-
ties that too many customary owners lack as 
they enter the unfamiliar formal land system 
(Box 3).
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Absence of mandatory protective 
lease conditions established in 
legislation
These paragraphs consider what manda-
tory protections are found in the legislation 
of Vanuatu. It is in a sense the inverse of 
the previous section (Registering Customary 
Land), which looked at how intrusive (or pro-
active) the Department of Lands should be 
in supervising dealings in customary lands. 
If the Department of Lands was very proac-
tive in protecting customary owners’ interests 
then fewer mandatory protections would be 
needed in legislation, and vice versa. Many 
common law systems have legislation that 
imply conditions into leases or protect inter-
ests that fall outside them.20 The problem in 
Vanuatu is that the Department of Lands is 
not assertive in protecting customary owners’ 
interests, nor are there mandatory protec-
tions in legislation.
Conditions that can be implied into leases 
by statute (‘Implied Agreements’ — LLA 
ss. 40–41) tend to control use of the land by 
the lessee/purchaser; for example, condi-
tions may be implied restricting the use of 
land or the subsequent sale of the land. A 
contentious issue in Vanuatu is the leasing 
of land and subsequent subdivision of it into 
residential plots without the permission of the 
customary owner.
Some interests in land will continue to 
exist even if they are not registered along with 
the lease (‘overriding interests’ (LLA s. 17) as 
in ‘overriding the registration’). In England 
such rights include rights for people or live-
stock to cross land, to hold fairs, and other 
rights known generally as ‘customary rights’. 
More modern rights such as leases of less 
than three years and legal easements are 
also usually included under these provisions. 
Although there is unlikely to be direct correla-
tion between traditional rights on opposite 
sides of the world, this is a neglected area 
of law in Vanuatu that may hold substantial 
possibilities for defining and representing 
customary rights in the formal system.
In Vanuatu, implied conditions are easily 
excluded from leases21 while at the same 
time including overriding interests in leases 
is the safest way to establish and protect 
them. These are both issues of lease nego-
tiation and drafting. Where a country, such as 
Vanuatu, has few mandatory conditions in its 
legislation then the process by which a lease 
is negotiated becomes much more important; 
‘power issues’ come to the fore such as the 
knowledge and understanding of the negoti-
ating parties, financial resources and access 
to professional advice.
This is made clear in the debate over the 
Strata Titles Act 2000 (as amended by the 
Strata Titles (Amendment) Act 2003), which 
does not require the consent of the custom-
ary owners (‘lessor’) to be sought before their 
land is subdivided into residential plots. The 
National Land Summit argued that custom-
ary owners should have the right to approve 
such developments. However, as a recent 
report points out, customary owners do have 
the right to approve or refuse these. Clauses 
stating this can be included when the original 
lease is negotiated or subsequently when 
a rural lease is converted into a residential 
lease: ‘the real issue is the lack of that knowl-
edge and experience (as well as the negoti-
ating skills) on the part of many customary 
owners’ (Hassall & Associates 2008:13).
Customary owners’ lack of legal 
knowledge and awareness 
undermines their negotiations  
with investors 
Land legislation and procedure in Vanuatu 
is complex and scattered across different 
pieces of legislation, some of which have 
never been used and others with contradic-
tory elements. For example, responsibility for 
foreshore planning is divided between two 
ministries and the provincial governments 
(Lunnay et al. 2007). There is an absence 
of freely available information on Vanuatu 
land law and procedure.22 The Ministry of 
Lands performs a neutral facilitation role, not 
a proactive advisory role. Despite the obliga-
tion to protect customary owners, the law 
and land administration treat land sales as 
being between parties equal in capacity and 
information.
Although some elite groups of ni-Vanuatu 
have become adept at land management and 
dealing, most customary owners will sell land 
only once. They are eager to sell but ignorant 
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of both the value of their land and the process 
by which it will be sold. Although customary 
owners may be land rich, they are usually 
cash poor. When they sell land they are deal-
ing with an experienced and informed private 
sector without the resources to obtain good 
professional advice for themselves. Indeed, 
getting this advice may make the land unpal-
atable to investors in a market where better 
gains are to be had dealing with the many 
other customary owners who will negotiate 
from a position of ignorance. The market for 
land in Vanuatu fails to reflect a fair price 
for land because the balance of information 
between the two groups of negotiating parties 
is markedly asymmetrical.
Access to professional advice is essential 
to redress this power imbalance. However, 
valuers, surveyors and lawyers are expen-
sive. In the outer islands such professionals 
are unavailable and as their costs will include 
air fares and stays of several days (due to 
infrequency of flights) they will be exorbitant 
to low-income copra farmers. Without a good 
understanding of the land-dealing process 
it can be difficult to appreciate the need 
for these professional services. Most often, 
customary owners will use these services as 
paid for by the purchaser. This creates clear 
conflicts of interest that should be carefully 
considered by all of the relevant professional 
bodies.
Purchasers often seek to ‘lock in’ cus-
tomary owners at an early stage. Payments 
or gifts (their exact status is unclear) are 
made and agreements may be signed. When 
customary owners show signs of hesita-
tion, threats of legal action to recover these 
amounts can intimidate customary owners 
who may have spent the money. The entice-
ment of the principle (‘lump sum payment’) 
and rent payments remains, while overarch-
ing all is the threat that another party will step 
in and do the deal.
Substantial inducements may be offered 
that appear to be for the benefit of the whole 
community. Property deals are littered with 
promises of 5-star hotels or joint ventures 
that will offer employment to whole com-
munities. Such promises are rarely fulfilled 
and often unenforceable. Land often remains 
empty in the hands of a developer waiting for 
more lucrative opportunities that are unlikely 
to include the customary owners.
Many customary owners are dismayed 
when customary land they have sold is regis-
tered, and re-sold for many times the amount 
they received for it. The registration process 
gives a guaranteed land title, meaning that 
land can be bought, sold, and borrowed 
against. This dramatically increases its value. 
Customary land is not of high economic value 
because there is no guarantee that someone 
else with a stronger claim will not come along 
and take ownership of it. Few customary own-
ers are aware of the added value they would 
gain if they themselves jumped through those 
administration hoops. Again, the absence of 
massive profits may deter property develop-
ers from purchasing pre-registered land.
In Vanuatu, a land valuation is required 
when a lease is transferred in order that 
government can levy land tax. No valuation 
of customary land is required before the 
critical first conversion of customary land into 
leasehold title. If customary owners knew 
the improved value of their land after it had 
been registered they would probably act very 
differently.
Activities of the private sector 
professionals
In many countries, estate agents provide pro-
fessional support to people who wish to sell 
their property. Estate agents usually act on 
behalf of the seller and seek to maximise the 
price as they take a percentage of the pro-
ceeds. In Vanuatu, some estate agents are 
known to purchase land on their own behalf. 
This sits uneasily with their duty to obtain the 
best price for their clients. 
In a system where there are few admin-
istrative safeguards and few mandatory leg-
islative protections, it is critical to protecting 
customary owners’ interests that they obtain 
good legal advice when leases are being 
negotiated and drafted. A lawyer’s duty is to 
their client who pays their fees. For this rea-
son, negotiating parties should obtain their 
own legal advice to protect their interests. It is 
common practice in Vanuatu for the purchas-
ers of land for leasing to pay all the legal fees. 
Consequently, these lawyers may be expect-
ed to act in the interests of the purchasers 
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when it is the customary owners whose inter-
ests are in greater need of protection. Leases 
that customary owners sign are remarkable 
in their brevity and uniformity when good 
independent legal advice would have allowed 
such leases to reserve rights over their land 
(such as reserving permission and benefits 
for subdivisions) and to negotiate leases that 
safeguarded longer-term financial benefits 
(such as emphasising annual rents over up-
front premiums).
Property developers are usually foreign 
and ‘white man’s law’ is seen as serving their 
interests. Lawyers often have close relation-
ships with property developers who pay 
for a substantial proportion of lawyers’ fee 
base while a certain disregard for customary 
owners’ interests is apparent in the lack of 
priority given to disputes involving customary 
owners.
Legal ambiguities and challenges
Because good legal advice is difficult to 
obtain, much legal information is passed by 
word of mouth and is inaccurate or ambigu-
ous. Such ambiguities include a perception 
that leases must be for 75 years when this is 
actually the maximum allowed and was any-
way intended only for ‘big investment proj-
ects’; other leases were meant to be limited 
to 30 years (Lunnay et al. 2007:8).
There is a perception that customary 
owners must compensate leaseholders for 
improvements to the property. If this was 
correct, it would mean that customary own-
ers would have to buy the houses and hotels 
that have been built on their land before they 
could receive that land back at the end of a 
lease. However, the perception is incorrect; 
it derives from the return of alienated land at 
Independence and does not apply today.23
This misconception is compounded by 
lease conditions that provide for automatic 
lease extensions or that exclude customary 
owners’ right to refuse a change of use of 
their land (from agricultural to commercial, for 
example). Both such clauses are of doubtful 
legality.
These ambiguities undermine customary 
owners rather than property developers who 
are knowledgeable and have access to good 
legal advice. That they continue to circulate 
emphasises the power imbalances between 
customary owners and the purchasers of 
their land.
Many customary owners wish to remain 
involved with the land they lease for 
development, either as employees on tourist 
resorts or plantations, or through training 
or profit sharing. Investors tend not to be 
interested in such participation; customary 
owners have few skills or assets to offer the 
developer beyond labour and their land. Joint 
ventures impede free action. ‘Joint venture’ 
has been a recurring theme in land since 
Independence but no real understanding or 
guidance exists as to what form or structure 
such joint ventures should take.24
Customary owners have seen how quickly 
cash payments are frittered away and how 
quickly vehicles purchased with these pro-
ceeds deteriorate. To develop mechanisms 
that protect windfall payments to ensure they 
provide longer-term benefits remains an elu-
sive challenge.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution was definite in its protection 
of customary land but the failure to promul-
gate a permanent national land law, coupled 
with the need to protect colonial landholdings 
in the short term, meant that the postcolonial 
era saw an ironic strengthening of the formal 
colonial system at the same time that land 
was nominally being returned to customary 
ownership.
This paper has described a process of 
converting customary land to leasehold title 
that is deeply fraught. Ministers of Lands 
have wide-ranging powers, the exercise of 
which opens them to allegations of conflict 
of interest in a sector where business and 
political interests have significant overlap. 
The Department of Lands is challenged by 
a tension between its constitutional duty to 
be proactive in protecting the interests of 
customary owners and its pre-Independence 
(and more typical) role as a neutral facilitator 
maintaining the Register of Leases.
Legislative change can improve specific 
areas but as the legislation that is in place 
is not systematically enforced this may have 
limited impact. Substantial improvements 
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could be made within the current legislative 
parameters; the power of the Minister of 
Lands to enter into leases could be scruti-
nised and reviewed; the Department of Lands 
could improve procedures, requiring valua-
tions of customary land (at registered land 
value) and insisting that customary owners 
receive independent legal advice. Scrutiny 
of the activities of the professions associated 
with the process must begin. Customary own-
ers could also be encouraged to act more 
responsibly themselves.
Finding ways that ni-Vanuatu can par-
ticipate in economic development while at 
the same time preserve their customary sys-
tems and culture is the key challenge facing 
proponents of custom such as the National 
Cultural Centre, the Malvatumauri and, by its 
own declaration, the Government of Vanuatu. 
The land reform program may be the most 
important driver of change in this area but it 
should not be the only one. Although land is 
important to custom, custom is not just about 
land. Protecting various land-use rights in 
leases is only one manifestation of how a 
customary group may engage with the formal 
system. Problems also occur between  the 
customary and formal systems in criminal jus-
tice and governance, even without introduc-
ing broader societal issues such as gender 
imbalances. Moreover, many of the problems 
and possible solutions lie outside the land 
sector. Joint ventures can be about land but 
also about tourism and business. The lack of 
financial management skills seems to have 
been a problem in almost every attempt 
made by customary groups to cooperate in 
the management of assets.
This paper has sought to highlight seri-
ous inequities that derive from the interaction 
of the formal system of land administration 
with customary land tenure. At the same 
time, if Vanuatu is to take full advantage of 
this nation-defining resource, engagement of 
custom with the formal system needs to take 
a cross-sectoral, holistic approach.
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ENDNOTES
1. Many individuals generously gave their 
time and knowledge in the course of this 
research. Particular thanks go to John 
Alilee, Daniel Adler, Francis Hickey, Anita 
Jowitt, Alick Kalmelu, Chief Seth Kaurua, 
Ben Kaurua, Russel Nari, Anna Naupa, 
Chief Tom Numak, Prof. Don Patterson, 
Douglas Patterson, Jean-Marc Pierre, 
Chief Petro Rite, Menzies Samuel, Joel 
Simo, Benuel Tabi, Howard Van Trease, 
and Alicta Vuti. Thank you to Jennifer 
Bryant, Derek Brien, Patrick Shing 
and Milena Stefanova for their support 
throughout.
2. Legislation under the formal system uses 
‘custom owner’; proponents of custom 
argue that formulations such as ‘custom 
landholder’ or ‘rights-holder’ are more 
appropriate and accurate, denoting a 
quality of custodianship. This discussion 
encapsulates the miscommunications 
between the systems.
3. The intention that this legislation was 
to be temporary is made clear within it, 
for example, by the heading preceding 
Part 1 of the Land Reform Act 1980, 
which reads ‘To make interim provision 
for the implementation of Chapter 12 of 
the Constitution.’
4. The actual term used in the Constitution 
(art. 79) is ‘land transactions’.
5. The LRA (s. 1) definition of ‘alienator’ 
is someone who has freehold title at 
the time of Independence.  Under this 
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definition, the Minister of Lands’ power to 
deal in disputed land could be restricted 
not just to disputes over alienated land 
in general but only to land that was 
alienated at the time of Independence.
6. Naflak are ‘clan identities organised 
according to matrilineal descent’ and are 
found in central Vanuatu (Fingleton et al. 
2008).
7. See, however, comments by the judge in 
Traverso v. Chief Kas Kolou [2003] VUCA 
26: ‘Whether there is a dispute or not 
is a matter for the Court and not for the 
Minister.’
8. Information as to whether the minister 
continues to sign leases over disputed 
land after the National Land Summit 2006 
would be useful in clarifying this point.
9. In which titles to land are entered in a 
register, usually guaranteed by legislation 
and backed by government, instead of 
proving title to land by deeds.
10. As these are principles under ‘British’ law, 
they apply also to Vanuatu law under the 
Constitution (art. 95(2)).
11. The ‘Kastom Ona Blong Kraon’ form 
was originally developed for the land 
committees — an informal dispute 
resolution system set up to deal with the 
logjam in the island courts.
12. See Vanuatu Daily Post, 9 March 
2009, p. 4, ‘with the stripping of the 
title ‘Popovi’ from chief Kalontas Daniel, 
chief Tapangatamate advised investors 
in north Efate that all leases signed 
under Kalontas Andrew are automatically 
nullified’. This dispute has now been 
appealed to the Supreme Court.
13. See Lunnay et al. (2007) for complete texts 
of both documents. For definitive versions 
please refer to original documents.
14. In this case the geographical difficulties 
of an archipelago nation are compounded 
by the complex bureaucratic structures. 
The Planning and Enforcement Section 
(Department of Lands) must work through 
the provincial governments (which come 
under the Ministry of Internal Affairs) to 
access the area secretaries who are the 
closest government representative to the 
meetings (Lands officials, pers. comm.).
15. ‘The application of this basic common 
law rule can … be quite disastrous for 
unsuspecting third parties, who deal with 
an apparent owner of property believing 
that he or she is the true owner when in 
fact that is not so.’ (Farran & Paterson 
2004:156).
16. The Valuer General’s forfeiture powers 
are defined in the LLA (ss. 43–46) as 
included under section 37 of the Valuation 
of Land Act 2002. Failure to include lease 
conditions that protect customary owners’ 
property means there is little in them to 
enforce and this valuable power is under-
utilised.
17. The ‘Report on the land lease audit test 
over Second Lagoon, Efate, Vanuatu’ 
(draft 4 August 2008) identified an 
average annual outstanding rent amount 
of 42 million vatu (nearly US$400,000) for 
2005–2007. The Ministry of Lands was 
second only to the Ministry of Finance in 
generating revenue for the Government 
of Vanuatu (Ministry of Finance figures, 
Kunal Patel, pers. comm., March 2009).
18. The relevant units (Environment Unit, 
Planning and Enforcement section, 
and Lands Survey section) each 
have 1–2 operational officers with 
wide responsibilities and national 
ambit. Problems of understaffing are 
compounded by the time and costs 
attendant on servicing an archipelago 
nation comprising more than 60 inhabited 
islands with infrequent air services.
19. The State Law Office Act 1998 gives 
power to the office to advise ministers, 
not to limit their activities. No prosecutions 
have taken place under the Leadership 
Code 1998, despite numerous breaches 
identified in Ombudsman reports.
20. See, for example, England’s Law of 
Property Act 1925, Solomon Islands’ 
Land & Titles Act CAP 133, and all 
states in Australia (where they are called 
‘paramount interests’). In contrast, neither 
New Zealand nor Fiji (which modelled 
its legislation on New Zealand’s Land 
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Transfer Act 1952) include them (Prof. D 
Patterson, pers. comm.).
21. Both sections 40 and 41 of the LLA begin 
‘Save as otherwise expressly provided in 
the lease’, allowing lease provisions to 
override the implied agreements.
22. One notable exception has been the 
‘Graon toktok’ series produced by the 
AusAid-funded Short Term Land Reform 
Initiatives project.
23. See page 3, and LRA (s. 3) and Alienated 
Land Act 1982 (s. 3). Note, however, 
that in keeping with comments made on 
inequitable negotiation of leases, some 
leases appear to include clauses that 
require compensation for improvements. 
This is distinct from the statutory 
compensation discussed here.
24. Under the Land Policy Communique 
1980, ‘joint ventures’ were to be agreed 
with customary owners to develop rural 
land, although this provision did not make 
it into the legislation (Lunnay et al. 2007).
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